The Civil Rights Commission: 1957-1965. By Foster Rhea Dulles. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968. Pp. xiii, 274. $7.50. by Wasserstrom, Richard A
Reviews
The Civil Rights Commission: 1957-1965. By Foster Rhea
Dulles. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press,
1968. Pp. xiii, 274. $7.50.
Richard A. Wasserstromt
The life of the Civil Rights Commission during the first eight years
of its existence deserves careful and thoughtful investigation. In the
first place, the time between 1957 and 1965 was a tumultuous one for
the civil rights of black Americans. The period is bracketed by the
passage of the 1957 Voting Rights Act, the first piece of civil rights
legislation since Reconstruction, and by the Selma-Montgomery march
and the demise, shortly thereafter, of at least a major phase of the
Movement as a movement. A study of the testimony at the Commis-
sion's hearings, its findings, and its reports provides a rich and vivid
source from which the character of American thought and action dur-
ing this period can be elaborated and understood.
Second, and closely related to the above, both an analysis of the in-
ternal operations of the Commission and an examination of the rela-
tionships which existed between the Commission and other govern-
mental agencies, such as the Department of Justice, the Congress, and
the Presidency, would be interesting. For this sort of inquiry could
tell us much about the official attitudes toward the problems of civil
rights during this period, and much about the genuine strength
and breadth of the federal commitment to the eradication of racial
discrimination and its consequences.
Finally, and again related to what has been said, there is a real
sense in which the Civil Rights Commission was consistently at the
"radical" end of the spectrum of governmental agencies concerned
with the civil rights of black Americans. Its policies and its proposals
were, on the whole, more unconventional, more innovative, and more
insistent upon the rapid satisfaction of the claims of black people than
were those of any other duly constituted agency of the federal govern-
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ment. Since the positions taken by the Commission mark the "left-
most" limit to which official policy ever went, a study of the Com-
mission could constitute a significant means for delineating the in-
tellectual boundaries beyond which official thinking never ventured.
The subject is dearly of consequence, and it is unfortunate that
Professor Dulles does not do it complete justice. Nonetheless, there
is much that Professor Dulles does teach us and still more that we
can learn through explication of his text. Before looking more closely
at its flaws, therefore, it is important to consider a few of the central
lessons that the book offers us about the Commission, the federal gov-
ernment, and the United States.
Title I of the 1957 Voting Rights Act established an independent,
bipartisan agency and specifically directed it to inquire into depriva-
tions of the right to vote on grounds of race, to collect information
concerning denials of equal protection, and to assess the policies of
the federal government in the whole area of civil rights. By law
the Commission was a temporary agency: in two years it was to
report its findings and recommendations to the President and the
Congress and then to go out of existence. At least two things stand
out in connection with the birth of the Commission. First, a major
argument for establishing the Commission was the felt need of many
of its supporters to discover the facts about alleged denials of black
people's civil rights. As late as the middle of the 1950's many respec-
table Americans still regarded the claim of widespread discrimination
against black people as an open question. So we find this ringing
declaration in Eisenhower's 1956 State of the Union message: the
Commission should be created and empowered to investigate the
charges "that in some localities Negro citizens are being deprived
of their right to vote and are likewise being subjected to unwarranted
economic pressures."' And this was further than many of his associ-
ates thought Eisenhower should have gone!2 Thus, in early 1957 the
case for civil rights legislation-the facts concerning the nature of
the Southern system of apartheid and the Northern systems of op-
pression-still had to be established.
No less depressing, perhaps, but less startling, is the reminder that
the Commission's birth gives us of the fantastic power which Southern
congressmen had gained and which they eagerly exercised in behalf
of the interests they served and sought to protect. Moreover this power
1. Quoted in F. DULUts, THE CIVL mRIGHTS CO, t.IssXON: 1957-1965, at 11 (1963).
2. Id.
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was fully matched by their vituperative rhetoric and warped convic-
tions. Thus, one Southern congressman's curious sense of analogy
led him to characterize the fact-finding commission as a "roving, elec-
tion-year Gestapo. '' 3 Thurmond, almost moderately, saw the Com-
mission as having been given "carte blanche authority to probe and
meddle in every phase of the relations between individuals. ' 4 His
colleague from South Carolina emphasized the reception which the
members of the Commission could expect to receive in the South
by indicating that he would seek to amend the bill to provide for
payment of their funeral expenses.5
Such language and such fanatical opposition to any attempt to in-
form about-let alone to change-the institutions of the South are
nothing new. It is a painful reminder of the stake that most Southern
Representatives and Senators had in the complete preservation of
that system of racial discrimination and exploitation. Moreover, they
accurately perceived that free and adequate information about its
genuinely oppressive character would endanger the system; it is not
surprising, therefore, that the language of Southern opposition to
the Commission remained unchanged throughout the eight year period
studied in this book.
As Professor Dulles correctly observes, "It was one thing to have
Congress create the Civil Rights Commission and quite another to
have the Commission become fully operative." The first ten months
of the Commission's two-year term were consumed with selecting
personnel. Eisenhower took two months to name the six Commis-
sioners, and Congress took another four months to confirm them;
it took nine months to appoint, confirm, and swear in the staff director.
The history of the confirmation process again tells us a good deal
about the state of the nation and the national mentality. Most reveal-
ing is the degree to which the selection of the Commissioners was
affected and corrupted by the belief that the most fundamental civil
rights issues were two-sided. It is not just that Eisenhower shied away
from persons with any sort of an established concern for or commit-
ment to the Movement. This is a tradition that all of his successors
have followed, to some degree, as well. Rather, what is shocking is
Eisenhower's concern that both sides of the "question" of the morality
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of segregation be represented on the Commission. The original six
Commissioners ranged, ideologically, all the way from John S. Battle,
the former Governor of Virginia and an avowed segregationist, to
the sole Negro Commissioner, Ernest Wilkins, who, in the words of
Professor Dulles, "did not awaken great enthusiasm in the Negro
Press."7 No wonder the Nation and the New Leader were less than
ecstatic about the choices." But the best indication of how "moderate"
the original Commissioners must have been was the announcement
by Senator Ervin of North Carolina that he was "pleased" with the
selections. 9
Professor Dulles' report of the confirmation of the first staff director,
Gordon M. Tiffany, recaptures the Congress at one of its worst mo-
ments. Of course the Southern senators opposed the appointment.
Russell chose the distinctive grounds that Tiffany was a Republican
and from New Hampshire;' 0 Eastland, true to form, went the route
of red-baiting,1 which in Tiffany's case wasn't easy. But nothing
reflects senatorial banality quite so well as Senator Dirksen's defense
of Tiffany. In addition to integrity and competence, Tiffany had
three special virtues, Dirksen told the Senate. He was a New Eng-
lander, an Episcopalian, and a father of two children.'- These inaus-
picious first encounters with the Legislature were matched by the Exe-
cutive's manifest apathy toward the entire undertaking. By the time
the Commission was fully organized, staffed, housed, and funded,
only a little over a year remained in which to conduct its inquiries
and to submit its findings and recommendations to the President and
the Congress.
Once underway, the Commission held hearings on housing in several
Northern cities and sponsored a conference for educators on desegre-
gation. Its major activity, however, was the series of hearings in Mont-
gomery in late 1958 and early 1959 on racial discrimination in voting in
Alabama. The Commissioners heard the now familiar accounts of blatant
denials to black people of the right to vote in any county where they
constituted a substantial proportion of the population. It is hard
today to assess the degree to which this was news in 1958 and 1959,
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abashed, but characteristic, defiance of the Commission's subpoenas
by the Alabama officials. For example, a Circuit Judge, one George C.
Wallace, announced that he would lock up any agent of the Com-
mission who attempted to get the voting records it had subpoenaed.
The Commission did not seek to match the power of the Federal
Government against the power of a state circuit court. Instead, be-
cause it received so little cooperation or compliance from the registrars
and probate judges who did appear, it voted to turn the record of the
hearings over to the Attorney General for such action as he deemed
appropriate. Brownell did file a civil suit which finally provided the
Commission staff with a hurried and generally unsatisfactory look
at the voter registration records from several counties.18
The Commission's first report was issued in 1959 and contained
three noteworthy recommendations: first, appoint temporary federal
voting registrars in places where a pattern of racial discrimination
existed; second, adopt a constitutional amendment abolishing all re-
quirements for voting except age, residence, and legal confinement;
third, cut off all federal funds to any institution of higher education
that discriminated on grounds of race. These recommendations were, at
the time, far-reaching and imaginative for a governmental agency. Six
years later, after they had been condemned by most of the liberal
establishment as unobtainable, unworkable, and extreme, most of the
recommendations were enacted into law. And this pattern of initial
condemnation and eventual enactment was to become a familiar one.
In 1959 and again in 196114 the Commission's life was extended for
two years; in 1963 the Commission received only a year's lease on life.15
Each time the script was virtually the same. The Chief Executive would
praise the Commission's work, urge that its existence be extended, and
then do nothing substantive to push Congress to act. Prospects would
appear gloomy until the eve or day of adjournment when a rider to
extend the Commission's life would finally be appended to another bill.
The impact of such a doubtful future was low morale, high staff turn-
over, and general internal inefficiency within the Commission.
The civil rights record of the Kennedy administration is all too often
romanticized, even by those who should know better; a look at how the
Commission fared under Kennedy can help to correct such a tendency.
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branch were indistinguishable from those that obtained under Eisen-
hower. Kennedy left unchanged the composition of the Commission;
he maintained the tokenism of one and only one Negro Commissioner
that was established by Eisenhower and continues to this day. Kennedy
did appoint somewhat more liberal, more academic persons to the
Commission."' But as Professor Dulles himself makes clear, whatever
Kennedy's basic commitment to civil rights may have been, he was
unwilling to try to translate that commitment either into legislative
program or tangible support.17
In fact, the Commission's relations with other parts of the Exec-
utive-most notably the Department of Justice-went from bad to
worse during the Kennedy administration. To begin with, the Com-
mission made the unforgivable mistake in its 1961 report on the ad-
ministration of justice to report that some persons had complained
of the FBI's lack of enthusiasm in investigating charges of police
brutality. This made J. Edgar Hoover angry. "He peremptorily de-
manded-with names-the facts on which the Commission's criticism
was based."' 8 And when they were not forthcoming he stormed some
more. The Department of Justice, as was its custom when Hoover was
involved, played it safe. Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall
finally suggested, according to Professor Dulles, "that the Commission
might just as well drop the matter, allowing time-though he did
not say exactly this-for Hoover to cool off."'1
In addition to the Hoover incident, apparently little consideration
was given to many of the Commission's sweeping recommendations
for protecting the franchise against discrimination. Certainly few of
the recommendations emerged in the Administration's proposed civil
rights legislation for 196320
More overtly, the Commission and the Department dashed, and
clashed repeatedly, over Mississippi. Three times between 1960 and
1963 the Commission decided to hold hearings in that most rebellious
and totalitarian of all states. To decide to hold hearings in Mississippi





20. Id. 176-77. There was, apparently, a genuine degree of mistrust of the Com-
mission on the part of some of Kennedy's closest advisors. Professor Dulles quotes
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mission [which] proved to be a somewhat uncomfortable ally" in the civil rights struggle.
Id. 180.
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of the Commission and its staff. Yet each time the hearings were
scheduled, the Department strongly objected to their taking place.
Thus in December 1962 the Attorney General refused to permit the
hearings to be held because they "might prejudice the criminal con-
tempt proceedings that his department was currently bringing against
Governor Barnett for his interference with James Meredith's admis-
sion to Ole Miss." 21 The Department must have wanted to prevent
the Commission from making its investigation for it is hard to credit
seriously a justification such as this.
Each time the Department objected the Commission acceded to
its request, albeit reluctantly. But as the situation in Mississippi grew
worse and worse, the Commission felt obligated to do something. So
in April 1963 it issued what was in essence an indictment of the
State of Mississippi.
The Report, which was very brief, just gave a devastating
picture of conditions in Mississippi from which the Commission
had received one hundred voting complaints since October: "cit-
izens of the United States have been shot, set upon by vicious
dogs, beaten and otherwise terrorized because they sought to
vote." It described the assaults which had been made upon civil
rights workers, including ministers and students, and the bomb-
ing of the Vice-Chairman of the State Advisory Committee's
home. It declared "even children at the brink of starvation had
been deprived of assistance by the callous and discriminatory acts
of Mississippi officials administering Federal funds. 22
Compounding the situation, in the Commission's eyes, was the
federal government's continuing to pour federal funds into Missis-
sippi, much of which went to support its system of racial oppression.
"One glaring example the Report singled out was a two million dollar
grant for building a jet airport to serve Jackson even though the ap-
proved plans called for segregated eating and restroom facilities. '" 21
The Commission's recommendations were twofold. First, Congress
and the President should "consider seriously"24 legislation to cut off
funds to any state which continues to defy the Constitution; second,
the President should explore his existing authority to withhold funds
from Mississippi until its defiance ceases. The liberal establishment
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another grim reminder of where the center of gravity lay in regard
to thinking about the problems of black people. The Administration
joined in, with the President publicly repudiating the recommenda-
tions and the Department of Justice explaining how "difficuilt" it
was to move faster in Mississippi.-25 By 1964, of course, we had Title IV
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The Commission's hearings reveal the national sterility of thought
concerning a number of America's most pressing racial problems. One
sees all too vividly the extent to which white America and Americans
developed a set of stylized, unvarying "solutions" to each aspect of black
people's problems. No matter what the context, no matter what the
time, no matter what the evidence, the responses seemed to remain the
same. What emerges most forcefully is the degree to which incantation
replaced genuine reflection and deliberation in many sectors of the body
politic on a whole range of the most important and critical issues. Two
examples out of many will have to suffice.
Consider first the problem of police practices. No matter who the
police chief, no matter what the city, whenever the Commission heard
his testimony about police practices and the administration of justice,
it could be sure that it would hear (1) that all allegations of police
brutality in this particular city are false; (2) that the police have for
some time now been mounting the most intensive campaign imagin-
able to recruit more Negroes into the police (the doors are wide open
but not enough qualified applicants are interested); and (3) that even
though (or because) there is no police brutality here, it would be a
dreadful, irremediable mistake to set up any sort of a civilian review
board.20
Next consider the problem of discrimination in housing. No matter
what the time, no matter what the city, the Commission would hear (1)
that real estate agents are in no way responsible for the existence of
discrimination in housing and the attendant de facto racial segrega-
tion; (2) that such segregation as does exist is due entirely either to
the "natural" impulse of all persons to segregate themselves or to
the homeowner's wishes which the agents simply execute; and (3) that
there is only one solution to segregated housing, namely, gradualism
and enlightenment; irrespective of the immediate and awful discomfort
25. Id. 185-86.
26. See, e.g., id. 121, 125-27.
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of black people, they must realize that the only answer is time and
education.2 7
As was indicated at the outset of this review, there are several re-
spects in which Professor Dulles's inquiry is flawed. First there is a
matter that, on the surface, may be more one of style than of substance.
Professor Dulles often uses language which seems either unduly im-
precise for a scholarly work or else simply false if taken literally. For
instance, when talking about the Commissioners he says at one place
that "all six were always ready to give a high priority to Commission
affairs .... ,,2sNow "always" is a tough condition to satisfy. At another
place he describes the Commission staff as "wholly committed from
the very first to civil rights .... -29 Every member of the staff during
the eight year period? Wholly committed? And committed to what
exactly? Much earlier in the work he asserts that when Autherine
Lucy was expelled on a pretext by the trustees of the University of
Alabama "[t]he entire nation was deeply shocked."30 The entire nation?
Still again, Commissioner Storey is described as a man who "was held
everywhere in the highest respect."31 A rare bird, surely.
Language such as this both reflects and helps to create the per-
spective of good will and benevolence from which are interpreted
the motives and activities of virtually all of the actors discussed in
the book. This is an issue to which I shall return shortly. But even
if Dulles's use of language may be justifiable as rhetoric, there seems
to be no possible justification for his use and selection of sources.
What I found so surprising was the degree to which popular news
media were cited as apparently authoritative. It is one thing to cite
Time to illustrate a mood of popular thought and quite a different
thing to identify the characteristics of a person by quoting Time's
description of him. Thus Time becomes the authority for the prop-
osition that the Battle of Virginia was "a resonant voice for political
moderation.32 Look is cited for an assessment of Father Hesburgh. 83
The use of some of the sources seems to me to be no less disturb-
ing. At times a kind of uncritical acceptance of the written word
takes over-often when it should be most suspect. To take just one
27. See, e.g., id. 50-61, 123-24, 157-62.







Vol. 78: 172, 1968
Book Reviews
example, the intentions and actions of the Kennedy administration
are viewed largely through the eyes of Sorensen's Kennedy and Schles-
inger's A Thousand Days. Reliance on such first-hand accounts can,
of course, be defended in certain contexts. But when assessing such
matters as motives and intent in the area of civil rights, one is entitled
to ask the historian at least to be suspicious of such non-objective in-
terpretations. In particular President Kennedy is consistently por-
trayed by these authors, and hence often by Dulles, as one thoroughly
committed to civil rights and constrained solely by the exigencies of pol-
itics. Thus, Sorensen said that the only reason Kennedy did not
propose civil rights legislation in 1962 was "arithmetic." 34 Still later
Schlesinger and Sorensen are jointly cited for the proposition that
"Kennedy had postponed action [on civil rights legislation] only
through an astute sense of timing."35 This may be right, but it surely
smacks of Panglossianism. In this crucial area, one would hope for a
greater reliance on less committed interpreters of presidential behavior.
This uncritical use of sources is a fairly minor criticism compared
with what seems to me to be the basic defect in Professor Dulles's ac-
count-the perspective from which he approaches his subject and the
effect this perspective has on framing and selecting the questions that
are asked. Let me try to illustrate what I have in mind. At one point
Professor Dulles, in discussing some of the criticism that greeted the
Commission's more innovative 1961 proposals concerning voting, says
"Even the staunchest adherents of civil rights were unwilling to go
as far as the Commission majority."30 To document this assertion he
refers the reader to the editorial comments of the Washington Post,
the New Republic, the New York Herald Tribune, and the Christian
Science Monitor. To do so, I submit, tells us more about Professor
Dulles's views than it does about contemporaneous reaction to the
Commission's thinking. If, as seems to be the case, the New Republic
ideology (to say nothing of that of the late New York Herald Tribune)
constitutes for Professor Dulles the full-blown commitment to "free-
dom now," then we can better understand and assess the perspective
through which he interprets the events of this period. There are some,
like myself, who would insist that this particular quartet of establish-
ment voices hardly comprises the core of the staunchest supporters of
civil rights'
34. Quoted in id. 153; see also id. 104-05.
35. Id. 190.
36. Id. 136.
37. Another example of what I mean is found in Professor Dulles's description of
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One cannot be certain whether or not this perspective is causally
connected to the omissions that occur in the book. But it is evident
that there are important unasked questions and significant unex-
plored topics. The first concerns the relationship of the Commission
to the Movement. If Professor Dulles had regarded Movement organi-
zations and leaders as paradigmatic examples of the staunchest sup-
porters of civil rights, he might well have sought to focus more ex-
tensively on their opinions of what the Commission should have
done and what it should have proposed. Instead, he gives little atten-
tion to the ways in which segments of the black community assessed
the workings of the Commission. In writing and thinking about the
work and composition of the Commission it does seem to me to be
of more than casual interest to reflect upon how the Commission-
and perhaps even the country-might have thought differently about
issues if it had more actively solicited and seriously considered the views
of persons like Robert Moses, James Foreman, James Farmer, Howard
Zinn, and a host of others. For all we can tell from Professor Dulles's
book, this never happened. More importantly for the point directly
under consideration, he never seems to have concerned himself with
why this never happened or what the consequences might have been.
Just as it might have been helpful to elicit Movement opinion of
the Commission, so it would have been equally important to ask
more directly why the Movement and Movement personnel were so
little involved in the work and deliberations of the Commission. There
were no hearings that concerned themselves in any very significant way
with eliciting the direct testimony of Movement workers and leaders.
And apparently there was never a staff report or Commission publica-
tion that focused directly on the Movement and related agencies for
social change.
Similarly, the whole question of how the Commission was staffed
is not analyzed. If there is one thing that more than anything else
reflects the degree to which the Commission never left the mainstream
of white America, it is the degree to which it was and still is dom-
inated by whites. Reference has already been made to the unvarying
the views of Eugene Patterson, the editor of the Atlanta Constitution and a Johnson
appointee to the Commission. Dulles says ". . . [Patterson's] realistic attitude toward
the Negro demand for equal rights was set forth in an editorial .... " Id. 217 (emphasis
added). Now, "realistic" in this context is a difficult notion to make clear, but it is
evident, at least, that Dulles approves of Patterson's views. It also suggests rather
strongly that views and attitudes to the "left" of Patterson's would be regarded by Dulles
as "unrealistic." This, too, constitutes a perspective for understanding and assessment.
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token representation of black people on the Commission itself. The
same point could equally well be made about the senior staff positions.
The staff director-the key man on the Commission-has never been
black, nor, with one brief exception, has the general counsel. But
my concern here is not with the substantive issue of racial control
of the Commission; it is rather with the way in which analytic history
in this area ought to be done. Although Professor Dulles does tell us
the race of those Commissioners who were black, he almost never
considers the general question of the racial or ideological composition
of the staff, nor does he seek to probe or to question the limited
role that black people played throughout the period under investi-
gation in formulating the policies and programs of the Commission.
At one point Professor Dulles does comment, admittedly obliquely,
on this matter, and the comment is instructive. The Commission es-
tablished State Advisory Committees in each of the fifty states. In
describing the composition of the committees Professor Dulles says:
"The State Advisory Committee personnel included lawyers, labor
leaders, clergymen, former government officials, civic leaders, and when-
ever possible, one or more Negroes." ' That is all; no further com-
ment. But what does it mean to say "whenever possible"? That there
were states in which there were so few Negroes that none could be
found who were willing to serve? Or that there were states in which
there were so many Negroes that it was impolitic to appoint any? Or
that there were states in which the "right kind" of Negroes could not
be found? Or that there were states in which influential whites would
have refused to serve if eligible Negroes had been appointed? The
point is that what was probably at issue in staffing these committees
were matters of fundamental policy concerning their composition and
the kind of advice they would receive. If I am right, Professor Dulles
both fails to elucidate and analyze these matters of policy and implies
that it was not a matter of policy at all-only one of what was "possible."
Finally, there are important omissions concerning both the internal
operation of the Commission and the relationship of the Commission
with other departments of the Government. We learn, for instance,
that there was friction between the staff and the Commission.
9 We
learn, too, that this is because the staff on occasion seemed too zealous
and unobjective on behalf of civil rights. What does this really mean?
38. Id. 29 (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., id. 155, 227.
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It tells us far less than what we would know were we told what sorts
of proposals had been made by the staff and rejected by the Commis-
sion. We would then see more clearly what the Commission considered
a lack of "objectivity" about civil rights. In the same way, we are
left with an unsatisfactory understanding of the nature of the contro-
versy between the Department of Justice and the Commission. This
could have been elucidated only by probing beneath the level of public
statement and official communication. But it is a route Professor Dulles
never elects to attempt. Nor does he endeavor to explore the variety
of informal, more devious means that the Commission almost surely
employed to get its views considered seriously by the rest of Govern-
ment.
It is easy to write the history of the Civil Rights Commission if
one makes the comforting assumption that the Commission-and the
Government, generally-were fully committed to the rapid and com-
plete satisfaction of the needs of black people, with the Commission
representing, if anything, the radical fringe of legitimate response. The
more difficult but vastly more illuminating undertaking for the scholar
is to write a history of the Commission-to say nothing of other
agencies of Government-which turns this assumption into one of
the central hypotheses that needs to be proved. Such a history remains
to be written.
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